By
Alan Griffiths.
2000-08-02
Dear
friends,
This
here is my standard submission for you to use for the federal public inquiry.
Please take what you need from the information provided and form your own
argument. It is essential that this inquiry receive as many individual
submissions as possible, not the same word for worded one a hundred times over.
Also, please don’t forget to include you address details, over wise it won’t be
accepted.
We
need as many individual protest letters and submissions as possible. So please
make a special effort on this one, even if you just write a paragraph of
protest.
Good
luck,
Yours
sincerely,
Alan
Griffiths
Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties
Australia's
relationship with the World Trade Organisation
www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct
The
Treaties Committee shall inquire into and report on the nature and scope of
Australia's relationship with the WTO. The Committee's examination will
include:
·
opportunities for community
involvement in developing Australia's negotiating positions on matters with the
WTO;
·
the transparency and
accountability of WTO operations and decision making;
·
the effectiveness of the WTO's
dispute settlement procedures and the ease of access to these procedures;
·
Australia's capacity to undertake
WTO advocacy;
·
the involvement of peak bodies,
industry groups and external lawyers in conducting WTO disputes;
·
the relationship between the WTO
and regional economic arrangements;
·
the relationship between WTO agreements
and other multilateral agreements, including
·
those on trade and related
matters, and on environmental, human rights and labour standards; and
·
the extent to which social,
cultural and environmental considerations influence WTO priorities and decision
making.
If
you have any comments on Australia's relationship with the WTO, let us know by
25 August 2000. Comments can be sent by email or by post.
Comments to:
Committee Secretary on PH: 02 6277 4002 or FAX: 02 6277 4827
or e-mail: jsct@aph.gov.au
Submission to the
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
Australia's
relationship with the World Trade Organisation
1. Opportunities for community involvement
in developing Australia's negotiating positions on matters with the WTO.
Two years ago the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) was
defeated in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). OECD
Secretary General Donald Johnston said there were lessons to be learnt for the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) from the failed MAI negotiations at the OECD. He
believes that the pressure brought to bear on governments by civil society was
the single most important reason for the ceasing of the MAI negotiations.
It is commendable
that this inquiry has been called to investigate Australia’s relationship with
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, as author of this submission I
hold grave doubts as to the viability of Australia benefiting at all from its
membership in the WTO. I feel that the best way to ascertain whether
opportunities may exist or not, for community involvement in developing
Australia’s negotiating positions on matters of the WTO, is to take a critical
and detailed assessment on:
1.
the recent history of
previous trade & investment negotiations, including
2.
the negotiations in
the WTO and the MAI, and
3.
the conduct of
Australia’s official consultations, or lack there of, with Australian
communities.
First
of all I would like this Inquiry to take note of my protest against Australia
continuing further negotiations at the WTO while this ‘public inquiry’ is in
progress. I find it ironic that this is the second time that such negotiations
have be allowed to continue unhindered, while a public inquiry investigates
ways and means of making the negotiation process more accountable and
transparent.
Secondly,
the cut of date for submissions is too soon. How can members of the public be
expected to provide any analysis on how all the 20 WTO agreements could affect
them, let alone a well-resourced NGO? A minimum of a year is should be adequate
enough time, not just one month.
INTRODUCTION
Australia will not be
able to effectively include community involvement in its WTO negotiations until
it factors in the costs associated with the ‘free trade’ agreements that it is
currently negotiating. Nowhere is the systemic BELIEF that Australia will
benefit from ‘free trade’, without factoring in the costs to Australia’s
communities, more apparent than in the events surrounding the near collapse of
the Uruguay Round in the early 90’s.
‘During the early
1990s, when the Uruguay Round was on the verge of collapse, GATT leaders urged
persistence, citing computer model projections for world-wide income gains from
the Round of some $500b, more than double the estimates of other groups, while
the USA proclaimed that the Round would be worth $6 trillion over fifteen
years. The Australian Government was claiming, on the basis of OECD and IC
studies, a GDP boost for Australia of A$2.5 to 3.7b, though some trade
officials privately thought that A$1b was more likely. At one stage the OECD
Secretary General, Jean Claude-Paye, dismissed such figures as a ‘pretty theoretical exercise’, but Peter Sutherland
(GATT Director-General) stood by them manfully and once testily asked a
sceptic ‘don’t you believe in free trade?’’
Graham Dunkley, ‘The
Free Trade Adventure’, p134, Melbourne University Press.
These computer model
projections only factored in the perceived benefits without calculating the
costs associated from the lowering of tariffs for instance. Under the delusion
that Australian business had a lot to gain from the establishment of the WTO, the
emphasis has always been to include business groups and peak bodies as part of
its official trade delegation. Now in the advent of the rise of civic society
and especially in the advocacy role that many non-business-NGOs are
instigating, Australia has been caught on the back foot.
To placate growing
public concern without changing its overall trade strategy, Australia is likely
to continue its ‘free trade’ stance while at the same time paying lip service
to labour and environmental concerns. To actually include non-business-NGOs in
a meaningful way would entail a re-writing of its analysis, to include the
projected costs associated with ‘free trade’ onto Australia’s communities. This
would be a disaster for big business and could even undermine the whole ‘free
trade’ agenda espoused by the WTO. The last thing big business wants is an
inclusive, democratic, transparent and publicly accountable system that factors
in the costs that ‘free trade’ policies have on those communities that have yet
to be involved in the negotiations.
HISTORY OF LACK OF
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
As part of its trade
delegation to the 1999 Seattle WTO Millennium Round, Australia included 8 big
business and industry group representatives, while at the same time excluding
community and non-government organisations that represented over 1 million
Australians.
These
NGOs included the Australia Council for Overseas Aid, the ACTU, Greenpeace, the
WorldWide Fund for Nature, World Vision Australia, the Australian Council of
Social Service and the Australia Conservation Foundation. These NGOs lobbied to
be included in Australia’s trade delegation to Seattle and even offered to
spare the taxpayer the expense of their services by paying their own way. To
counter the ensuing public criticism over its snubbing of these NGOs the
Australian government promised to conduct daily briefings with the broad range
of groups in Seattle.
These
meetings however failed to eventuate. ‘Monday evening’s briefing was the
only one attended by the Minister and senior negotiators. On Tuesday a junior
negotiator provided a briefing and there were no other briefings held at all
for the remainder of the week.’
Monday, 13 December 1999,
Anna Reynolds, Australia Conservation Foundation (ACF), Seattle
STANDARD
OF ADVICE
The
standard of the advice that has emanated from Mark Vailles’ trade delegation
should cause grave concern for all Australians. One of the most effective ways
Australia can maintain a healthy economy is by protecting the health of its
environment and people. As reflected by Anna Reynolds, our future may have been
seriously compromised by the incompetence of some of Australia’s official trade
delegation:
‘A
briefing today by the Hon Michael Mecher, UK Secretary for the Environment
confirmed my fears that Australian environment officials do not understand
trade and environment issues. Last night an Environment Australia official said
to me that he could see little reason for my concerns about the establishment
of a new Biotechnology (GMO) Working Group inside the WTO.
This
morning Michael Mecher stated - There is great potential for conflict between
the WTO and the Environment treaty that is already being negotiated to tackle
GMO issues - the Biosafety Protocol. The WTO dealing with this issue will see
conflicts about GM labelling.’
Thursday, 2 December 1999, Anna Reynolds, ACF,
Seattle
Obviously
the traditional understanding of what may be defined as a community can be
likened to the sense of a belonging to either a cultural, historical,
religious, indigenous, socio-economic and/or civic grouping, etc. The inherent
weakness in defining all groupings or alliances as ‘communities’ in the
traditional sense of the word can often distort their real intentions. For
instance defining business groups as ‘business communities’, does in fact
conceal their real agendas which inturn contradicts the perceived role in how
traditional communities should function. And when these ‘business communities’
are called upon to represent Australia, for instance, they will inevitably only
represent their own narrow self-interests. Nowhere is this more apparent than
in the concerns raised by the ACF in Seattle:
‘ACF
understands that the Australian Government is seriously considering support for
a GMO trade deal as part of its efforts to see agriculture liberalised.’
November
30th Press Release, Anna Reynolds, ACF, Seattle
The
problem here is that in its desperation to gain American support to help prise
open access to the heavily subsidised European agricultural markets for its
farmers, DFAT (Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) is willing
to trade away the wishes of the majority of Australia’s population to having
their food labelled for possible GM (genetically modified) additives. The
recent decision by the Australia and New Zealand Food Authorities (ANZAF) to
enforce strict mandatory labelling of food could be seriously undermined or
deemed illegal by the WTO, as a ‘non-tariff-barrier’ to the trade in food.
If
Australia’s National Farmers Federation (NFF) successfully challenges these
labelling laws through the WTO, the NFF must be held legally and financially
accountable to the risk that GM food imposes on our communities and
environment. Given that the NFF says that the labelling of food will be too
expensive and difficult to enforce, what are the risks and costs associated to
Australia’s communities if we do not label our food? The benefits of labelling
must be measured against the costs to our health and environment if we do not
label. The absurdity in reversing Australia’s policy on mandatory labelling is
that Australia will still have to label its exportable produce to Europe in
order to satisfy their stringent requirements.
To
understand the full extent of DFATs’ lack of accountability to its employers,
the Australian tax payer, we need to look at similar negotiations that have
failed dismally, due largely in part to the arrogance and incompetence that our
past negotiators have conducted themselves in. By doing this we will see if
there is a role that non-business-communities can play in the WTO negotiations.
A fitting example for this exercise is to look at the behaviour of the
Australian representatives involved in the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on
Investment) negotiations. An important question to bear in mind is has
Australia actually reformed its negotiation process?
MAI:
Australia’s Mutually Assured Incompetence
Two
and a half years after the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) was
supposed to have been signed, the Australian public was finally alerted to its
existence on ABC’s Radio National Background Briefing report, titled ‘The
Quiet Debate’ on November 30, 1997.
Shortly
after, a national ‘STOP the MAI’ campaign was established to defeat the MAI.
One would have thought that the ensuring debacle brought about in no small part
by Australia’s negotiators, consisting of bureaucrats from Australia’s Federal
Treasury, would have taught the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT) a lesson. Thanks to the establishment of this very same inquiry
back in March 1998, to conduct the national interest test in Australia’s
involvement in the MAI negotiations; we are now able to reflect on the aptitude
of various departments and State governments to the MAI from their published
submissions made to this committee.
State
Government and Federal Department Submissions to the 1998 Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties public inquiry into the MAI
1.
Parliament of Victoria FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Although
Victoria was not party to the MAI negotiations, this joint ALP and Coalition
committee’s submission to this inquiry had more than ample opportunity and
evidence to not only:
·
fully analyse the
likely affects the MAI had to Victoria from the MAI documents that were
available. But
·
consult with their
respective constituents as to their concerns about the MAI, ie. Were any
concerns from Victoria’s unions, indigenous, women, environment, civic,
business and/or development NGOs, etc included?
Unlike
members of the public that only had access to the 14 February 1998 MAI
Negotiating Text, the members of this state committee also had access to the
commentary text that explained the negotiating text. Unfortunately however the
members of this state committee seemed to under utilise or comprehend the full
extent of this document.
Although
this committee did raise concerns including the MAI’s threat to:
·
undermine ‘the
States to foster local investment and development’ *, and that
·
‘4.1 Historically,
the provision and regulation of infrastructure and utilities by the States has
played an important role in fostering economic growth and development in
Australia.’ * plus acknowledged
that,
·
‘4.2 The MAI
Negotiating Text applies the principles of non-discrimination on grounds of
investor nationality to privatisation, monopolies and government enterprises.
This would have potentially serious ramifications both for the administration
of, and the privatisation of, State Government Business Enterprises and for
their ongoing use by the States to foster State economies.
·
4.3 The Commonwealth
Government has expressed an intention to seek to protect certain areas, such as
the media and communications, using the MAI exceptions procedure. The
Federal-State Relations Committee feels it is important that the Commonwealth,
when considering sectors of the economy which it wishes to except from the
scope of the MAI, bears in mind the historical and continuing interests of the
States in such areas as the provision of infrastructure and utilities.’ * and raised
concerns that,
·
‘5.1 The MAI
Negotiating Text contains special provisions exempting prudential regulation of
financial services from the scope of the MAI...’
* and recognised that,
·
‘5.2 Currently,
Australia’s non-bank financial institutions are regulated under an inter-State
co-operative regime. The Federal-State Relations Committee would be concerned
if the provisions of the MAI were to interfere unduly with this regime.’ * Although this committee also raised concerns about the MAI’s
arbitration process and
·
‘6.2…that the use of
international arbitration to resolve disputes under the MAI could result in a
limitation of the proper commercial jurisdiction of each State’s Supreme
Court.’ *
*
April 1998, Submission No 404, p. 856, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
Parliament of Victoria
The
most blearing example in this committee’s failing was its inability to raise
any concerns on how the MAI threatened Victoria’s:
environment,
indigenous and workers rights including working conditions, plus our civic,
cultural, economic and/or democratic rights, etc!
In fact this report was tabled almost to the day the of Victoria’s MUA dispute.
Bordering on incompetent, it seems that it was easier for the same Labor
committee members to join arm in arm for a photo press opportunity with the
sacked dockland workers, than it was to comprehend the risk that the MAI had to
the entire work force at large! Given that the evidence was freely available on
the web, through unions, environment groups and overseas affiliates, it is
deeply disturbing to say the least that the committee members couldn’t be
bothered to delve any further.
Unfortunately
however nothing seems to have changed. With Labor now in government they still
seem to be oblivious, ignorant and/or apathetic to the threat that the WTO has
on their constituents. Even more worrisome is that the MAI has not gone away.
It is being negotiated at the WTO under a different name, known as the GATS
(General Agreement on Trade in Services).
2.
Peter Reith’s
Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business (DWRSB)
‘DWRSB
is of the opinion that the investment liberalisation aims of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment do not require the inclusion of a provision on labour
standards. We do not believe that the MAI as an investment agreement should be
concerned with labour standards or that the OECD should be in the position of
defining and arbitrating labour standards. This is an area for the
International Labour Organisation, which is the competent international body to
set and determine international labour standards. We support the position of
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on this issue and are strongly
opposed to the inclusion of human rights clauses in trade and investment
agreements. We have been working closely with Treasury on this matter.’
19-5-1998,
Submission No. 511, p. 1117, Volume 6, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
The Parliament Commonwealth of Australia.
This
paragraph alone highlights 3 main flaws;
a)
The International
Labour Organisation (ILO) has no legally binding mechanisms to enforce its
agreements. This is a standard practise (according to the Washington based
Preamble Centre for Public Policy) for trade negotiators to avoid the
responsibility of including workers rights; because they know that the ILO is
powerless to enforce the same signatories of trade agreements to also honour
agreements protecting workers rights.
b)
That the DWRSB was
not representing Australia at the MAI negotiations yet was privy to secret MAI
documents, beggars the question about the role of due democratic process. Ie.
Any negotiations should include processes of transparency to ensure that the
discussions, especially between government departments, are kept in line with
the wishes of the Australian public.
c)
Considering that
prior to the current capacity of DFAT’s involvement in the WTO, they opposed
the inclusion of labour standards in the MAI; raises serious questions to the
viability of human rights groups being involved in any effective capacity
within Australia’s negotiations at the WTO.
3.
Treasury
‘1.54 The Treasury submission is a disappointing
document especially from the department responsible for the MAI, because it
does not assist us significantly in evaluating the agreement. Running to only
eleven pages, it provides a quick summary of issues rather than addressing the
MAI in more detail. It fails to provide, for example, systematic discussion of
the implications to Australia or particular aspects of the draft text, though
it asserts many advantages. Nor is there an explanation of the official negotiating
position, no matter how qualified it may be at the moment. The rational behind
providing such a flimsy submission appears to be that the agreement is still in
draft form. However, this overlooks two points: first, the Treasury ought to be
in a position to provide the Australian people and the Parliament with a full
analysis of what they have been negotiating at considerable public expense on
our behalf for the past three years; and, second, this inquiry has been
referred to the Committee both by the Senate and a Government Minister and
deserves to be treated with due regard.’
‘The
Treasury’s evidence’, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Interim Report, May
1998, p,18, The Parliament Commonwealth of Australia.
EGG
ON THEIR FACE
Although
this created a severe amount of embarrassment for the Treasury bureaucrats who
were negotiating the MAI on our behalf in secret, it fails to convey just how
idiotic they conducted themselves before this hearing. These officials verbally
stated to the committee that the MAI was in Australia’s interests to sign. The
members on the inquiry demanded that the Treasury officials present evidence to
back up their claim. The Treasury officials were forced to admit under oath
that they were unable to present any evidence what so ever!
What
the hell had Treasury achieved in the 3 years of secret negotiations?
·
They had failed to
conduct any research or commission any independent analysis on the likely
affects and cost that the MAI was to have on Australia!
·
After promising to
consult with the Australia’s local governments they had failed to do so!
·
Even though local and
state governments were party to the full extent of the provisions of the MAI
and were not privy to the negotiations, Treasury refused to even consider
following the United States lead by protecting these areas of government with
open ended exemptions!
·
While promising to
protect indigenous culture they had failed to consult any indigenous
representatives!
Given
the erroneous implications to Australia if we had signed the MAI (without the
public’s consent), surely Treasury would have been able to at least present
SOME evidence to this inquiry? This should be blatantly obvious by now that if
they had NO evidence, then the MAI negotiations was purely ideologically driven
in the BELIEF that the MAI was good for Australia. Just as the establishment of
the WTO was based on a mirage of evidence, so was Australia’s involvement in
the MAI! This is not the way to conduct ones’ self especially when representing
a country in the international arena! If you want to believe in something then
go and join a church or a hippy commune. If you’re after a transcendental
experience, try shaving your head and meditating on a mountaintop. If you’re
feeling insecure, talk to your councillor. But for crying out loud, when
negotiating on Australia’s behalf deal with the FACTS, not in some ephemeral
notion that if you sign away everything to transnational corporations that they
will turn around on some whim and behave in the best interests of humanity. If
you honestly BELIEVE that the only way forward for the world to survive
sustainably, is for transnational corporations to self regulate themselves in
an open market, then I recommend that you seek psychiatric help. Immediately!
As grass roots campaigner Alan Griffiths for ‘STOP the MAI’ demanded:
Where
did Treasury read that the MAI was within Australia’s interest to sign? ‘On
the toilet walls of the OECD?’
16-7-1998,
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties public hearing, Parliament of Victoria
Surely
these officials should be made accountable to the taxpayer. If they can’t be
charged and or made to serve a jail term on grounds of incompetence, corruption
and/or criminal negligence for falsely representing Australia’s interest? Then
why not dismiss these officials? Or confiscate their assets to accrue the loss
of tax funds that were wasted on the last three years of the MAI negotiations?
To simply let them off the hook and allow them to go back to their jobs is
absolutely derisible! Given that some countries execute their bureaucrats on
lesser charges, this is not much to ask for.
NO
ACCOUNTABILITY
As
the tabling of the Interim Report on the MAI by this committee to Parliament
attests to, the depth of Treasury’s abysmal and blatant disregard to any form
of accountability was becoming apparent;
‘The
MAI struck me as more than a little bit of an international diplomatic joke
that was attempted to be played out on the people of Australia... As the member
for Barton said, there is a role for the bureaucracy who have been at the heart
of the negotiations of this treaty to prove the case, and to date they have
not. They have failed miserably, and I think with a great deal of arrogance and
dismissiveness in the way that they conducted themselves. That the Department
of the Treasury should front the Treaties Committee with a written submission
moments before a hearing takes place I think is an outrage…We cannot allow our
bureaucracy to acquire frequent flier points flipping around the world every
six weeks, off to Paris to negotiate a particular treaty. This has been a fact
of life, and is one of matters (sic) we
have uncovered in our discussions and deliberations as a committee. I find it
astonishing but it was not until the end of March this year after the foreign
minister and, indeed, the Senate referred the matter to the Treaties Committee
for inquiry, for public discussion, that we started to find out a few of these
things which had been happening behind the scenes.’
1-6-1998,
Mr Hardgrave (Moreton) (12.43 p.m.), Treaties Committee Report,
Representatives.
Mr
Hargraves observations are most revealing for it implies that the ministers,
Parliament and the people of Australia were totally unaware of what the
Treasury bureaucrats were up to, which off-course is quiet correct. This is the
most damning failing of Australia’s due democratic processes and must be
immediately addressed if there is to be any perceived role Australia’s civic
communities can play in Australia’s negotiations at the WTO. Unfortunately
however, as I will address later on, this will not occur so long as Australia
refuses to revise its analysis of the perceived benefits versus the costs to
its communities from its membership in the WTO.
4.
Minister for Finance
‘On
20 April 1998 the Minister for Finance declined to lodge a submission on the
grounds that the MAI was the Treasury’s responsibility. We wrote back to the
Minister on 12 May 1998 requesting a submission dealing with matters relevant
to his portfolio: a reservation on privatisation, which falls within the
Finance portfolio has been foreshadowed by the government.’
‘Other
Commonwealth departments’, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Interim
Report, May 1998, p,18, The Parliament Commonwealth of Australia.
5.
Department of
Industry, Science and Tourism
‘1.57 Of greater concern, however, is the refusal
of the Industry, Science and Tourism portfolio to lodge a submission. In a
letter to the Committee dated 13 May 1998, the Minister for Industry, Science
and Tourism advised that he saw ‘no need’
for his department to prepare a formal submission for the Committee but was ‘happy
for Departmental officers to appear before the Committee if required’.
1.58 The Committee views this as an inadequate
response particularly as administrative arrangements list investment promotion
as part of the portfolio. In addition the following matters of direct relevance
to the MAI fall within his portfolio: manufacturing and commerce including
industries development, science and technology, including industrial research
and development; marketing, including export promotion of manufacture and
services; tourism, including the tourist industry; construction industry;
duties of customs and excise; bounties on the production of goods; offsets to
the extent not dealt with by the Department of Defence; patents, designs and
trade marks and consumer affairs.'
‘Other
Commonwealth departments’, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Interim
Report, May 1998, p,19, The Parliament Commonwealth of Australia.
The
WTO is negotiating a MAI under a different name, ie the GATS (General Agreement
on Trade & Services). Given that the Department of Industry, Science and
Tourism has yet to approach any of the Australian businesses, personnel,
employers and employees, etc, it represents as part of its’ portfolio; how can
the Australian government expect to see Australian communities taking an active
role in the WTO negotiations? Especially considering if the same government
chooses to neglect its responsibilities in at least informing their very
constituents about the GATS. Duh!
Sadly
we have not witnessed any change of behaviour from Australia’s former Treasury
negotiators to our current DFAT representatives at the WTO. These DFAT
bureaucrats often preach about the virtues of ‘free trade’ to Australia and the
benefits we will reap through our co-operation at the WTO. There ‘transparent’
processes of negotiations have been demonstrated across Australia through their
‘public consultations’ leading up to the Seattle Round in 1999.
DFAT
Hearing, 22-9-1999, Brisbane
‘The
meeting was attended by over 100 members of the public. Based on those who
identified themselves and some familiar faces, the audience included business
people, representatives of community, student and church organisations, and
members of the general public in their own right.
During the first half-hour of the hearing, Peter Husson, First Assistant
Secretary of the Trade Negotiations Division, made a presentation giving DFAT's
position to be put before the WTO.
The meeting was then opened to questions and comments from the public.
To DFAT's discredit, the meeting was not chaired or facilitated in any way. In
particular, there was no process to form a speaking queue. This made for a
chaotic meeting which occasionally became a verbal scramble with members of the
public vying to be heard. The general result was that the less assertive
members of the audience tended to not get a hearing. More incredible was the
fact that the hearings were not taped, although some handwritten notes were
apparently taken. In short, I found DFAT's conduction of the meeting totally
unprofessional.
It was notable that not one member of the audience who spoke was supportive of
the DFAT position.
The general mood of the meeting was that DFAT had already made up its mind and
that the views presented at the hearings would not influence DFAT's position.
This view was reinforced when Mr Husson did not deny this, stating only that
the public’s concerns would be 'noted’.
This was reinforced repeatedly by Mr Husson's comments in response to speakers
to the effect that 'that is your view but others would have another view'.
Understandably, the meeting voiced the view that this hearing was no more than
a token exercise.
Some points raised by the audience included:
You are telling us about the benefits of free trade and nothing of the costs -
eg. high current account deficit/foreign indebtedness and growing gap between
rich and poor.
Countries should have the sovereign right to choose their trading relationships
on the basis of human rights, protection of social and environmental standards,
preferential treatment of domestic industries, etc. Why should foreign
corporations be given open slather and the hands
of government, i.e. the democratic wishes of the people, be constrained?
Threats to agricultural resource base arising from global competition (on basis
of price) given Australia's impoverished resource base and erratic climate
compared to northern hemisphere.
Exposure of public health, education etc. to foreign corporate penetration and
eventual end to public sector on 'monopoly' grounds.
Failure of DFAT to consult with JSCOT (Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties) on issues of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). This was
confirmed by Mr Husson.’
24-9-1999,
Richard Sanders, STOP-MAI e-mail list,
R.Sanders@mailbox.gu.edu.au
In
short, after the demise of the MAI, OECD governments including Australia
promised to consult fully with the public prior to any future negotiations.
This token effort by DFAT and similar OECD government agencies was to placate
criticism that the WTO negotiations were not transparent. So therefore after
the demise of the MAI it was back to business as usual.
As
this next example will attest to, even if the WTO has a set formal process for
negotiations, this does not guarantee Australia immunity from the incompetence
of our own officials.
DAFT
DFAT STRIKES BACK:
‘Victorians
could lose their jobs and a factory faces extinction because of a bureaucratic
bungle. A technicality in an international trade deal has left workers at the
Lilydale factory fighting for their jobs. Its product - a giant capacitor used
in the power industry - was unwittingly lumped into a deal abolishing tariffs
for the tiny capacitors used in computers. Overseas competitors are now
importing the big capacititors tariff-free, so ABB Transmission and
Distribution is losing millions of dollars in domestic sales. Workers fear they
will be struck on the dole queue …; if the factory is forced to close. "There's
a lot of people here that would never work again," ABB stores
co-ordinator Dolly Maher, 63, said. Industry Minister Nick Minchin said the
matter had been raised with the World Trade Organisation, but the tariff could
not be reinstated without the support of 48 countries. Victorian Manufacturing
Minister Rob Hulls labelled the oversight a "monumental
stuff-up".’
Herald
Sun, Friday, January 21, 2000 50 face sack in bungle By Jen Kelly &
Karen Collier Fifty
Conclusions
a)
Unless the Australian
government drastically revises its ‘free trade’ analysis by factoring in the
costs of the agreements on Australian communities, other than big businesses
there are no opportunities for community involvement in developing Australia's negotiating
positions on matters related to the WTO.
b)
Allotting one only
month for public input is disgusting. The WTO evolved out of 50 years of secret
negotiations. It’s about time that this institution was made to be more
democratically accountable and transparent to those who have been locked out of
its processes, but it won’t happen through just one month of public
consultation!
c)
Victoria Parliament’s
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS COMMITTEE must convene an emergency briefing to be
conducted preferably by Ted Murphy, Assistant Secretary to the National
Teachers Education Union. This committee must demand an extension to the Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties August 25th deadline, so as to
properly:
i.
conduct state wide
consultations with all stake holders,
ii.
prepare a detailed
analysis on how all stake holders are likely to be affected by all the WTO
agreements,
iii.
not only demand but
take it upon themselves to place open ended exceptions not only on all areas
likely to be affected, but an open bracketed area for all future categories as
well,
iv.
demand a national
referendum on Australia’s membership to the WTO,
v.
demand that
corporations be made criminally liable for any anti-democratic influence that
that may directly affect Australia,
vi.
confiscate assets of
corporations that have abused Australia’s due democratic process,
vii.
either deport or jail
CEO’s and members of business think tanks that are found to have contributed to
the demise of Australia’s due democratic systems and process,
viii.
demand Australia’s
DFAT officials be made criminally liable for miss -representing the wishes of
Australians, ie over concerns of GM food,
ix. demand that Australia withdraw from all WTO negotiations until such time that the Australian government can prove beyond reasonable doubt that we will all benefit from membersh